All eyes are on the new Kadima head Tzipi Livni. Do you think she will be able to form a coalition government or do you think Israel will go to early elections?

I think both Kadima and Labor and even Shas would like to avoid early elections despite their protestations because it is clear that there is a distinct shift to the right in the Israeli public and Likud has positioned itself to make maximum use of this shift and therefore is pushing for early elections. However Kadima and Labor understand that they are losing some of their seats currently and their support from the public and therefore need time to reorganize. So they might opt for maintaining a coalition government and avoiding early elections and try to create some system that will not rock the boat but will function for a while. So depending on what each constituent of the coalition wants for its own self interest there might be an agreement. That is, if Shas gets the money or the seat that it wants; if Labor gets again the agenda issues on the negotiations table or its own role in government. Shas of course wants guarantees on Jerusalem and negotiations. So it’s like serving the cake in ways that would serve the interest of each party and ultimately make it self negate and incapable of taking any decisions seriously or taking any decisive step.

After his resignation, Ehud Olmert recently said that Israel should return the West Bank and east Jerusalem to the Palestinians, something he did not offer during his time in office. Why do you think Olmert chose to make such a statement now knowing he could not make any deals?

As in the nature of all epiphanies in political power, people usually declare them when they have nothing to lose, so as usual, it is too little too late. He knows he’s no longer in office. He knows he cannot actively influence decision making but in a sense he can influence public opinion. It seems to me the value of such statements is in making them current, legitimate, and acceptable, and launching a public discourse or debate on issues where some taboos are broken. So despite the fact that it is too little too late, despite the fact that while he was in power he was pandering to the settlers and avoided any kind of confrontation, putting this on the record, at least in the public domain, may have some significance.

Do you think he was hoping Livni, assuming she becomes prime minister, would adopt these statements?

If he didn’t do it, and couldn’t, I don’t know whether he’s hoping that Livni will do it. But in some ways he’s hoping that his legacy would, in a sense, be vindicated. I don’t think he has much love lost for Livni, and he knows that she is going to face a tremendous challenge, even more than he did because added to all the backstabbing within Kadima and the coalition, you also have the added gender factor. So, she has quite a few battles on her hands and I doubt whether she will use this in order to move ahead and take daring, decisive decisions or whether this will serve only to curtail her freedom and to weaken her so that she won’t be able to make any decisions.

In general, how do the Palestinians view Livni, especially given that she has been heading the Israeli negotiations team since Annapolis? How much trust or distrust do the Palestinians have in her?

First of all, she hasn’t been negotiating with all the Palestinians. The only people who know her are probably two or three people in the [Palestinian] negotiating team. So it’s not a question of personal trust at all. It is a question of assessing her political position, her political record, and her public statements. And that’s how the Palestinian public as a whole judges a politician. I don’t believe you negotiate on the basis of trust. You negotiate on the basis of honesty and candor, representing your people and their best interests. So our negotiating team should have focused on that rather than on whether they like or dislike or trust their counterparts; it is irrelevant. For example, sometimes the best agreements are signed between those who do not trust each other because then you leave nothing to chance. Sometimes people who like each other or trust each other avoid certain issues or try to appease each other and so on. So they don’t sign airtight agreements. I think what we need now is not trust. What we need is a candid and courageous assessment of requirements for ending the occupation, of disengaging in a real sense after the ending of the occupation as a result of agreements that are based on international law and justice. That’s what we need. Whoever is capable of delivering that on the Israeli side – fine. But it is not a personal call or judgment.

If Livni does become Israel’s next prime minister, what kind of impact will this have on her negotiations with the Palestinians, if any?

Her public statements, and right now we judge only by her public statements, state that she’s going to proceed with negotiations, according to her declarations of intent, let’s put it that way. She wants to move, and she wants to move rapidly. But also within the public discourse are positions pertaining to the refugees and Jerusalem that are difficult and would formulate obstacles to negotiations. So if not for negotiations for their own sake, I’m sure she would proceed with them. The question is what is her substantive position on negotiations? If you exclude Jerusalem and you negate the refugees, you are not going to get anywhere. Within her coalition she might have to make some sort of compromise with Shas over Jerusalem. She might promise Labor that she will proceed with negotiations and on the other hand she might look the other way like every Israeli leader has before her on settlement activities and their expansion.

Do you connect with Livni because she is, as you are, a female politician working in a male dominated world?

I understand that she has an added burden; I understand that she has more challenges. I may disagree with her politically but as a woman, I know what it means to be a female in an exclusively male club where the attacks can be very vicious, where attempts happen at de-legitimization or exclusion or undermining the standing of a woman… It’s very easy to judge women by more stringent standards. It’s very easy to try to bring women down through cruel means and so on. So that is one area in the political domain that I do understand, and I know what she is facing. But I also know that to succeed you must not adopt the current or prevailing male ethos, or attitude, or politics of power and intimidation. If a woman is to succeed in politics she has to bring her gender with her. Attempting to be a watered down version of the male politician won’t get you anywhere because there are always male politicians who will be even more vicious, more cruel, more power driven, rather than [focusing on] consensus, good governance, justice issues etc. If she is going to make a difference as a woman she is going to have to understand that she cannot fight discrimination against women but allow for discrimination against Palestinians. She cannot fight injustice at home but allow for the occupation to continue. She cannot fight for self-determination for women but negate self-determination for a whole Palestinian nation. She cannot fight for her own terrain as a woman and then rob a whole nation of its territory. So these things have to be part of her. She must be true to her gender.

bitterlemons: President Mahmoud Abbas has called for early elections. Do you support the idea of early elections?

Ashrawi: I support the idea of elections. I think elections are an absolutely necessary instrument of democracy and therefore the only way to settle disputes and allow the public to elect representatives and hold their representatives accountable. Elections are an essential tool for the creation of a responsible system of good governance.

On the issue of early elections, clearly the situation in Palestine is one of tremendous crisis in which we have reached an impasse. Elections are a positive way out rather than resorting to violence. Going back to the public is much more constructive than attempting to resolve things by a show of force and confrontation.

The timing is essential of course, because if you do have elections at a time in which the conditions are extremely volatile or in which you have a lack of consensus, or you have one party, regardless of how big or small, refusing to participate, then that can easily destroy the process itself and its credibility.

So we need a new national consensus or agreement and we need to recognize the necessity to hold elections, but at the same time we must understand that tempers are running high. The atmosphere, not just the objective conditions but the prevailing atmosphere, will also impact the outcome.

bitterlemons: You mention the atmosphere. Is it at all possible to hold early elections with Hamas adamantly opposed?

Ashrawi: It seems to me sooner or later Hamas has to understand that this is one way out. There is no win-win solution here, there is a lose-lose situation. Hamas has to understand that one way to resolve the impasse is by resorting to elections and if it is confident of its public support then it has nothing to fear. But this is one way of resolving the situation.

Of course you cannot have elections with part of the people or on part of the land and you cannot have elections in installments.

bitterlemons: So elections would have to include Gaza and Hamas would have to be on board for that?

Ashrawi: I think you need to have comprehensive elections both in terms of geography and in terms of demography and all the different political components of the Palestinian political reality. The Palestinian political system is pluralistic and we must respect pluralism and allow for genuine engagement.

bitterlemons: But Hamas might argue that elections were recently held, it was legitimately elected and there should be no need for new elections at the moment?

Ashrawi: You cannot have elections once and for all and say, "that's it". Elections do not give you a permanent mandate or an absolute mandate. It is common practice in all democracies that when you reach a situation of deadlock or breakdown then you go back to the electorate and say "I've tried and failed, either give me a new mandate or elect somebody else." This is common sense.

bitterlemons: Do you worry that if Hamas again wins elections we will be returned to square one, or would this resolve issues?

Ashrawi: If Hamas does win elections, both parliamentary and presidential, then that would be a very decisive victory. It would clinch the matter once and for all. Fateh and everybody else would have to recognize that this is the will of the overwhelming majority of Palestinians without any of the previous excuses that Fateh shot itself in the foot, that the numerical vote is in favor of Fateh or they cancelled each other out. All these issues will be resolved and we need clarity.

bitterlemons: There is also a suggestion that there may be early elections in Israel. Could early elections there bring about a positive dynamic in terms of peace efforts, or is there already a positive dynamic and Israeli elections would disrupt this?

Ashrawi: It depends on who gets elected. If you have the more extreme components, if you jump from the Kadima frying pan into the Likud fire, then that would certainly not be conducive to any kind of confidence in a peace initiative or a commitment to a viable negotiations process.

Now there are moves--whether the Arab initiative, American, however flawed, or international--to create a momentum for negotiations. There is a call for an "international meeting". Let's see what can be done to expand this to make it into a conference and get the international community to adopt the Arab initiative, to hold Israel to the requirements of peace in terms of having viable, substantive negotiations that would include permanent status issues. This is what we need to do now. The issue of elections in Israel is domestic, granted, but at the same time it will have an impact on the peace agenda. Not that we think Kadima has a peace agenda, but there is in the international community right now some attempt to create a momentum or a drive for peace.

bitterlemons: So Israeli elections could disrupt this momentum?

Ashrawi: They would have a delaying impact. Whenever you have elections, whether in Israel or in the US, the Palestinians end up paying the price by being put on hold waiting for the result.- Published 6/8/2007 © bitterlemons.org

Hanan Ashrawi is a Palestinian legislator and a member of the Third Way party.

This essay is adapted from a speech Dr. Ashrawi gave at the Palestine Center in Washington, DC on April 24, 2007.

Everybody has been talking about crisis management and damage control and will the Palestinian realities hold up or not and who's doing what and so on without really getting back into the real issue of whether there is an opportunity for peace or not. Yes, we all agree that these are very difficult times indeed, and we all know that the terrible Ds or the dreadful Ds have come up again. We see in Palestine a process of de-development, deconstruction. We see devastation, deprivation and, of course, leading to the attitudes or the moods of despondency and despair. All these are not conducive to peace. But out of all these terrible Ds or dreadful Ds, is there an opportunity for peace? Is there a promise despite the difficulties, despite the problems? Now, that requires a confluence of several factors to come together, and they have to be crowned by the political will to intervene positively and to do something to change realities on the ground. So, I will try this afternoon to talk about what works and what doesn't work if we really are to pursue peace and place it in a different context: the Palestinian, the regional and the international or global.

Now, what doesn't work. Of course, we all know from experience that what doesn't work is disengagement or non-engagement. Like nature, any conflict resents, dislikes and abhors a vacuum. When there is a vacuum in any conflict, particularly a political vacuum, violence takes over and fills that vacuum. Extremism fills that vacuum. And this is exactly what happened given the fact that since the year 2000, there has been no peace process, the U.S. has kept its distance [and] there was no genuine intervention in order to re-legitimize peace. So, keeping one's distance is certainly quite counterproductive if not destructive. In cases of conflict, you do need the political will to intervene effectively.

What doesn't work also is selectivity. I will try to speak quickly to save some time for questions or discussion. Selectivity and exclusion or exclusiveness do not work. In Palestine, of course, the fact that the people decided that Hamas is not an acceptable interlocutor or not an acceptable result of the democratic process has led to serious ramifications, not least of which is the undermining of democracy in Palestine because there was a certain degree of hypocrisy-you can have elections provided you elect the people we like or you guarantee the outcome. We were, in Palestine, electing under severe conditions. We were under occupation, and of course a people traumatized and in pain and constantly subject to violence and escalation and ideology, they elected in kind-those who will respond in kind to this trauma and the pain. And I assure you that if we were in a peaceful, sovereign state, I'm sure you will find a very functioning, multi-party, pluralistic, enlightened system in Palestine. But anyway, regardless, we do have the results of these elections. Not only were they boycotted, the Palestinians were under sanctions-which is ironic again because for the first time in history you have a people under occupation and under sanctions at the same time-while for decades Israel has been violating international law, flouting the will of the international community and with no sanctions, sometimes with even full immunity. But because the Palestinians happen to elect the wrong people, now they are under sanctions. And now after the Mecca initiative and the forming of what is called the national unity government-sometimes I call it a coalition government-there is selectivity in the individuals: whom to talk to and whom not to talk to, who is worthy of dialogue and personal attention and who's not or who's Kosher and who's not. It doesn't matter. But certainly that has had, again, effects on the economy, on peace, on moderation in Palestine.

Throughout the region, it's the same thing. You cannot select a people to talk to whom you approve of and exclude others. You cannot say well Syria and Iran are outside the verbal realm, but everybody else is fit company. If you want to deal with the whole region, you deal with it in an integrated way, and we'll talk about it soon. The Baker-Hamilton study, of course, gave us several handles on how to move ahead. It may not be perfect, but at least it is much more insightful than other attitudes and studies. Syria has been saying, "Let's make a deal. We want to make peace. Talk to us. Let's negotiate." And Israel reacted with the utmost of horror, with awe. How dare Syria propose to negotiate? So in a sense, there are options, but are there takers? That's the real question.

Of course, conversely, what works is a comprehensive, integrated approach both to the region and to all the players [and] to the peace process itself, including all the major players in the region regardless of whether you like them or not. Unlike friends, interlocutors and negotiating partners are not people you have to love. And you don't have to choose them or marry them or whatever. So, you need to be able to talk to everybody. Again, the peace process has to be inclusive in terms of all the topics it addresses. You cannot deal with parts of Arab land. You have to deal with all of them. And when it comes to the Palestinians, you have to talk to all Palestinian interlocutors-those who were chosen by the Palestinian people. And fortunately right now, we all know that the PLO is the party in power to negotiate, and the presidency has the mandate to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinian people. There is no reason not to engage. To use the pretext that Israel has used for the last six to seven years-there is no partnership for peace-is entirely useless because there is a clear partnership and a properly mandated address for negotiations.

There is, of course, the Arab initiative that is ready. Again, it may not be perfect, but it is there. It's a comprehensive approach. It represents an opportunity for Israel and the rest of the world to have a comprehensive peace with all the Arab countries on board, and this is something they should pick up and run with instead of view with weariness and suspicion.

What doesn't work also is de-contextualization. This is particularly true when we address the issue of Iraq and Lebanon-the Iraqi quagmire and the Lebanese debacle, of course-and the lessons from those two experiences. The region is not a set of discrete, isolated entities or units. It is made up of a set of relationships and with an interactive public opinion that is quite open and easily influenced by events and highly politicized and highly critical. I'm sure you all know that. I don't believe there is any public opinion that is as political, as critical and as intrusive as the Palestinian and Arab public opinion. And, of course, they are easily affected by what's happening. The rise of violence and extremism is due to the failure of voices of moderation and a failure of will at producing a just peace that will work. Again, the lessons learned from Iraq and Lebanon should tell us that military power has its limits, particularly in the region when you are fighting against either irregular forces or a captive civilian population. No matter how strong your army is there is no way in which you can defeat the will of the people or defeat irregular forces. You may bomb, shell, destroy, kill thousands, but at the same time [if] there's a people bent on being free, they will be free ultimately unless you eradicate all of them. And if there are irregular forces, you cannot defeat them using a strong army, and that experience in Lebanon and Palestine has proven that.

The dangers of unilateralism whether in the withdrawal from south Lebanon or the withdrawal from Gaza-if you insist on negating the partnership for peace, if you insist on negating the other and claiming there is no partner to talk to and acting unilaterally. We all know how unilateralism is a recipe or a euphemism for power politics. It's the dictation of the will of the strong on the weak because only the strong can afford to be unilateral, and we've seen that in Iraq, particularly when unilateralism is translated as the strategic doctrine of preemptive strike which is negative military intervention. And returning to UN resolutions, for the first time, Israel and the U.S. had to go to the UN and ask for a UN resolution and at the same time, they asked for international troops on the ground. All these are precedents, and these have to be understood in context again. They can be in many ways not a blueprint but influences or indicators for how to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli issue.

Another thing that doesn't work is polarization and dualism in the region. Of course, those who insist on dividing the region into devils and angels or axis of extremists versus a quartet of moderates or the Sunni/Shi'a divide do not understand the very complex realities and the nuanced reality of the region. And, of course, that makes it all that more difficult to engage in a genuine way and to try to find solutions. The fact is labels may be very convenient and may give you instant sound bytes but they do not give you handles on reality. And we do not want to be, as Palestinians, frankly a part of any axis or any alliance. We want to be free to engage with everybody and to deal with the region in such a way also as one way of losing your grips or your handles on reality in the region.

Within Palestine, again, we see this dualism and polarization. The latest elections prove that Palestinian society is extremely polarized. And I am saying this as [Palestinian Finance Minister] Salam [Fayyad] and I are in the Third Way, as you know. Salam was here last week. But the polarization was very clear between Fateh and Hamas, between people who had militias, people who had extreme ideologies and so on. The third alternative, including the old traditional left, did not make it numerically significant. We may be qualitatively significant but quantitatively certainly not that decisive. However, this kind of polarization reflects a certain malfunction. I don't want to say dysfunction. Dysfunction is for the Israeli political system. We have a malfunction in the political system, and it did happen at the expense of the pluralistic multi-party political system. We have again polarization between the government and the presidency, which we had hoped to overcome with the new government.

Again, we have the extremes between Gaza and the West Bank. They're dealing with Gaza as though it's a different reality, not just a geographic entity, but as though this is the Palestinian state while the West Bank is open up for grabs, open for dispute. And this so-called national unity government instead of genuine power-sharing became, let's say, a coalition government or a divvying up of these points and benefits and privileges, and that again is detrimental to political development.

Also, what doesn't work is procrastination and further transitions as usual. The whole concept of a state with transitional borders or what was called a transitional state is a very bizarre concept. I don't think it's ever been applied anywhere. There's no such thing as a state with transitional borders, and I hope that this is now dropped from the lexicon of politics and the region. We cannot have a state with transitional borders and we cannot have further transitions, which would be buying time for Israel to create facts in order to continue with the settlement expansion, with the building of the wall, with the annexation and transformation and captivity of Jerusalem. All these things cannot continue because they are the foundations of peace. When Israel is given a free hand unilaterally to predetermine their fate and their outcome then you're destroying the very foundations of peace.

And, of course, we talked about the U.S. dual approach. Now, the dual approach of the U.S. is the one plus one. Get [Israeli Prime Minister Ehud] Olmert and [Palestinian President] Mahmoud Abbas to talk one on one, Palestinians and Israelis, on issues of security and conditions of freedom of movement and conditions of life and so on. Now we've tried that before. When you talk about conditionality, when you talk about conditions of life, when you talk about Israel determining whether its security conditions have been met by the Israelis, this is a recipe not just for paralysis but for regression. So far, these meetings have not produced anything. Remember how many meetings they had before, and issues like release of prisoners and so on were supposed to be resolved and have not been. So, you raise expectations, you do not meet them, the let down can be extremely dangerous. So, one plus one does not work. We talk about bilateralism as being, again, the will of the powerful over the week.

Now, there is a four plus two. Israel asked for the four plus two, which is what they call the Arab Quartet plus Israel and Palestine. This is another term for normalization. Israel then wants to be recognized, wants to be accepted in the Arab world-let's talk, let's adopt the Arab initiative as a basis and then change it because we have reservations about the right of return, about Jerusalem and about settlements but we'd love to meet Saudi Arabia, for example. So, the four plus two is another formula for normalization.

Then there is also the four plus four plus two, which is the regular Quartet with the Arab Quartet with Palestine and Israel. So, what's different from the international conference? In that sense, why not go straight to the international conference? Let's put together a coalition of the willing for peace this time and see whether we can make a difference. So what works? Rapid, bold, decisive steps straight into permanent status issues that we all know; we do not need to reinvent the wheel. We do not have much time.

Now in Palestine, everybody is asking, how long will this government last? The average lifespan of any Palestinian government has been about eleven months to a year, so far, since 1994. So, I think this government will be coming to its end very soon by the end of the year, probably if it is within the average. Now how would this government end? How long will it last? How would it end? It depends on other factors, but if there is agreement, this government could be in preparation for elections. Elections cannot take place without consensus, without the agreement of all parties involved, particularly Hamas and Fateh. So maybe between now and the end of the year, there can be elections if all parties are convinced that early elections can work or it can be a preparation for a new type of government which we had advocated earlier: a government of professional, independent nationalists and not a factional government because factionalism has been detrimental to the development of a national program.

So, let's have a government of professionals, of independents who do not put factional interest above national interest and who are capable of building a system of meritocracy. We don't want them to be, you know, brilliant politicians. We want them to start providing services to people. That's what we need, and we need institutions to be built. Now that's another option. The third option, of course, is a horrible option of a breakdown and violence, particularly given the fact that there are people who are stockpiling weapons- it's no secret. We should be very careful about that and notice it.

Now what doesn't work, of course, is violating the rule of law. In the peace process, you cannot violate international law and international humanitarian law. You cannot accommodate settlements and allow for settlement expansions and allow for the building of the wall and the annexation of Jerusalem. You cannot begin by negating [UN Resolution] 194 and the Palestinian refugees' rights and then say, "Well now that we've done all these things, let's start negotiating," because that would deprive this peace process of its legality, of its very foundations in international law. And again, the same thing in Palestine, we also need the rule of law. And the rule of law requires primarily security reform. We do not need to reinvent the wheel, again, but it has to be implemented.

The security forces cannot be political forces, they must be depoliticized and they must not be engaged in anything financial. They must be reformed in terms also of their numbers. The militias have to be disbanded, including the executive force. I do not see the executive force as a legitimate security service. It is a militia and it was given the title of a security force. All illegal weapons must be collected. The use of weapons must be regulated, particularly in Gaza. The security services must become law enforcement agencies rather than power centers for warlords and tribes. We must get rid of tribalism.

If you do not have rule of law, if people do not have recourse to justice, then what you will end up with is revenge because so many things have happened, particularly in Gaza. There are many families that have their own militias and as a result, again, of economic deprivation, militias have become a way of making a living for some of the young men. So if you do not have due process, if people do not have recourse to the law, then of course they will take the law into their own hands and revenge, within a tribal traditional system, will continue to be the main motivation.

The National Security Council has to be a credible and effective council and not, again, a combination of power basis and leaders. Lawlessness and kidnappings have to end. We cannot continue to say that we want to build a state and at the same time act outside the law and kidnap journalists and others. Now with Israel, of course, there has to be an upholding and an extension of the period of quiet to include also the West Bank. All these incursions in the last couple of days have killed nine Palestinians. The incursions are ongoing in the West Bank-the destruction, the abductions, this has to stop. And with Israel, we need to carry out an exchange of prisoners, and Israel has to stop the taking of hostages as well because the PLC [Palestinian Legislative Council] members and the cabinet members have been abducted as hostages. So, we do need a prisoner exchange that is rapid and decisive. Now again, what doesn't work is the logic of violence. We all know that, whether with assassinations; incursions; infighting in Palestinians or in the region; the Iraqi war and the so-called war on terrorism.

What works is the logic of national building and reconstruction and peace. We need economic revitalization in Palestine if we are to engage in a genuine peace process. The international community is called upon to first lift the sanctions and the siege [and] two, return the funds, the Palestinian funds that Israel is withholding. The U.S. also has to lift the banking restrictions and the E.U. must end TIM. I don't know if you are aware of TIM-Temporary International Mechanisms. The E.U. adopted TIM as a way of sort of circumventing dealing with the government. So, TIM is a mechanism in which you give money directly either to the presidency or to the poor or whatever and you bypass the government. Now this has, again, wreaked havoc in the Palestinian national economic system because this way there is no transparency no accountability, and you have destroyed the Ministry of Finance and all the procedures of transparency and accountability. We need to go back to the developmental agenda, national building agenda rather than the agenda of relief and charity and welfare and emergency assistance and so on. The Palestinians have to return to a unified treasury account, restore transparency and accountability, meet the wage bill [and] end the paralysis in the public institutions.

They have just declared today another strike in the civil service. We need to provide the essential services. The health and educational services are really regressing in very drastic ways. We need to carry out serious reform measures, reduce the numbers both in the civil service and in the security. Reform requires a blue ribbon commission that is properly mandated, that is formed in accordance with the law and is properly empowered to carry out the reform. The last thing you need is a reform that is, again, a dividing of the spoils where Hamas will agree that it will have so many in the civil service, so many in the security, so many ambassadors, so many governors, and Fateh will have so many. This is not reform. That's why we call for a properly mandated, empowered blue ribbon commission for reform that has no vested interest [and] that will not have a conflict of interest.

Of course, we need internal empowerment and good governance. We cannot separate nation building from peace making, again. The international community must not think that exacting political concessions from Hamas is the only achievement; that this is one way they can get legitimacy for Hamas and get the peace process going, which is exactly what's been happening. The Hamas political agenda has really undergone some serious transformations. I don't know if you're aware of it, but they have accepted the two-state solution. They've accepted the long term period of quiet and ceasefire. They have accepted all these things. They recognized signed agreements, Arab legitimacy international legitimacy and so on. All the things we were asking them to do, they have done. But that is not the real issue. To me, the real question is what is the nature of Palestinian society? This is something that people ignore. What kind of society are we going to build? Are we going to build an open, pluralistic, tolerant society or are we going to go back into a closed ideological system? This is what we want to know. Is there a deal being made between Hamas and Fateh at the expense of the people? Now, I must say in all candor that Palestinians have always been quite protective and possessive of our fundamental rights and basic freedoms. And we will not condone-and I will say this again-we will not condone the destruction of books or folk tales. And we will not condone the banning of the dabkeh or music as being immoral. And we will not condone the blowing up of internet cafes or beating up of young women because of the dress code in Gaza or burning of schools. They just burned the American school in Gaza.

So what we need to do, which is what civil society is doing, is stand up to any attempts at capturing Palestinian society and transforming it by force into a closed regressive unenlightened ideological system. That's why we are calling, as another mechanism, the national council for culture, education and the arts. These are the legacies of the future generations. We cannot leave them at the mercy of one party or the other or the narrow concerns or petty ideologies of one party or the other. That council will be in charge of the curriculum rather than each party manipulating the curriculum to suit its ends. And for social justice, we need a women's commission and the information council.

Barely what works now is the two-state solution. What we need to do for the peace process, a rapid decisive and comprehensive peace process, is define the objectives and move rapidly within a binding timeframe with monitoring and verification mechanisms, with international assurances and guarantees and with a massive reconstruction and development plan. Without all these things together, using the Arab initiative as the focus, we will not get anywhere. The political horizon must not be what everybody talks about a receding line in the distance. Ultimately, it has to be a genuine landscape for peace.

Dr. Hanan Ashrawi is a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council and founder and chair of the executive committee at The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy, MIFTAH. She is a former Minister of Higher Education and Research as well as a Palestinian spokesperson.

A Summary of a Palestine Center Briefing by Dr. Hanan Ashrawi

The Palestinian political arena is currently moving toward the "politicization" of Islamic groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, whose impact on the July 2005 Palestinian legislative elections is yet to be measured. However, if Israel continues to undermine the prospects for peace by dictating a solution to the Palestinians through settlement expansion, the strangulation of the Palestinian economy, and unilateral actions—rather than engaging them directly—there will instead be an "Islamization" of the Palestinian politics, argued Hanan Ashrawi, a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council.

Speaking at a 11 April 2005 briefing at the DC-based Palestine Center, Ashrawi urged the United States to adopt a policy shift in its dealing with Israel. "U.S. standing, influence, and credibility in the region has been undermined by Israel's behavior on the ground," Ashrawi said. "It is in the interest of the U.S. to have a viable peace in the region."

Ashrawi argued that only a viable peace can counter fundamentalism and violence. A solution to the Palestinian issue will bring stability to the region and rectify the damage done to the U.S. standing in the Middle East.

"Palestinians expect the American president to develop a political backbone [so as] to tell Israel it has gone too far," Ashrawi said. Furthermore, the Palestinians look to a re-engaged U.S. administration that will put an end to Israel's unilateral actions and create an atmosphere for serious political negotiations.

Such an approach by the United States is what Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas needs in order to deal with the tough domestic challenges that are facing him. Abbas was elected on a platform of non-violence and a negotiated settlement. However, his ability to deliver a political solution has been undermined by Israel's unwillingness to work with him. "Abbas needs to be empowered by corresponding action from Israel and serious re-engagement by the U.S. administration," Ashrawi said.

Instead, the Israeli government is "busy transforming Abbas into a scapegoat" as it did with the late Palestinian President Yasser Arafat. She pointed out that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon will use his unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip to secure a U.S. recommitment to his plan to expand settlements in the West Bank.

Ashrawi pointed to Israel's decision to expand the settlement of Maale Adumim and the implementation of the E-1 plan which will link the settlement to Jerusalem. If implemented, E-1 would bisect the West Bank and completely destroy any chance for a viable Palestinian state.

The United States wants Palestinians to "accept the demographic changes on the ground" and rather than addressing the threats facing the peace process it is focused on nation-building, said Ashrawi. The United States expects the Palestinians to deliver a prefect system of good governance before the U.S. engages in negotiations. "That is difficult under military occupation and when you have no political options," Ashrawi noted.

Despite the difficulties, reform is a main component of Abbas' agenda. Reform, argued Ashrawi, will be determined according to Palestinian needs and priorities, not by Israeli and U.S. pressure. She added that several cases have been referred to the attorney general and that the reform movement is keen on implementing reform in accordance with the rule of law.

Reform in the security apparatus has proven difficult for Abbas. Israel and the United States want to impose their definition of security reform while Palestinians want an independent judiciary to deliver due process. Abbas, on the other hand, must deal with centralized power bases, security chiefs who have loyal followers, and the young generation with militias. Ashrawi stressed the importance of dealing with security reform in a way that "ensures the well-being of the Palestinian political system as a whole."

A crucial body in need of reform is Fateh, Abbas' political party. According to Ashrawi, Fateh lost much of its support because it adopted a failed peace process during the 1990s. Furthermore, as the party in power, Fateh is now blamed for all the ills that plague the Palestinian Authority. This has caused popular support to shift to Hamas and other Islamic groups.

"Fateh needs to rapidly put its house in order to influence the outcome of the July elections," Ashrawi said. She noted that this may be difficult as Fateh is engulfed in an internal crisis because of a power struggle between the young and old guards of the Palestinian leadership, referring to the reform-minded younger generation raised under Israeli occupation versus those who were part of the PLO in exile who "superimpose the mentality of the occupation on nation-building."

Ashrawi cautioned that if there are no positive developments toward peace and if Israel continues to act as an occupier, Fateh and the reformers will be further undermined.

"The political map is shifting. Unless there is a serious change and a contribution to nation-building that will empower moderates, we will move toward the Islamization of Palestinian politics," Ashrawi warned.

The above text is based on remarks delivered on 11 April 2005 by Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, an elected member of the Palestinian Legislative Council and Secretary General of MIFTAH, the Jerusalem-based Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue & Democracy. The speaker's views do not necessarily reflect those of The Jerusalem Fund or its educational arm, the Palestine Center. This "For the Record" may be used with out permission but with proper attribution to the Palestine Center.

Despite the predictable degree of uncertainty and apprehension that accompanies any transition, the post-Arafat era is exhibiting positive indicators in both spheres of nation-building and peacemaking.

The historical larger-than-life person and symbol of Yasser Arafat had served as a focal point for internal cohesion and as a historical reference for continuity and authenticity of identity. Thus he had served simultaneously as a gravitational force for centralized decision-making as well as for allocation of blame and rationalization for inaction or failure by others.

Arafat’s tangible absence has robbed both friend and foe alike of the convenient scapegoat that bore the brunt of their inadequacies and transgressions.

Israel’s prime minister Ariel Sharon can no longer exploit the claim of a lack of a “Palestinian partner” despite the fact that he had imprisoned that “absent” partner in the rubble of the Muqata’a. His unilateralism and militarism, including the Gaza “unilateral disengagement” plan, will lose their logic of exclusivity and power politics.

George W. Bush, in his second term presidency, can no longer avoid engaging in the politics of peacemaking in the region, particularly following his foray into military adventurism with its disastrous consequences. The absence of a viable peace process and of a credible US role have fueled the flames of violence, extremism, and fundamentalism, while giving the Israeli occupation space to create destructive facts on the ground (including illegal settlement activities and the horrific wall of separation and annexation), and license to destroy the most basic requisites of peace (including the validation of the integrity and rights of the other).

Internally, the Palestinian leadership—primarily comprised of traditional older-generation PLO returnees—has been deprived as well of its convenient excuse for inaction or failure, as well as of its historical safety valve and reference point. While Fateh moved quickly to unite ranks and consolidate its hold on power, it held on to the symbols of the past all of whom belong to the old school despite their title of “new leadership.” The younger generation and the leadership that emerged under occupation rather than in exile, although overtly excluded, are maneuvering to maximize their gains within the movement’s structure and hierarchy in return for giving their support (thus their constituency and legitimacy) to the aging leadership.

Clearly, both the national political system and the Fateh organizational rationale are undergoing substantive transformation during the current period of transition. The democratization of Fateh and the future ascendance of the younger leadership is one outcome of this period, should change take a positive direction. If the old guard, however, stick to their guns as the alliance of the weak and continue to hold on exclusively to power and privilege, they will be signaling the demise of Fateh as well as the end of their individual careers.

At the national level, the key words for the public include good governance, security and stability, and a just peace. To achieve those, a simultaneous and comprehensive program of administrative, financial, and personal reform and accountability must be launched immediately and institutionalized in a public and transparent manner. A full separation and upgrading of powers must take place to ensure the rule of law and professionalism in all public institutions be they executive, judicial, or legislative. Political patronage, cronyism, abuse of position and misuse of public funds, and other forms of betrayal of the public trust must be publicly and actively combated to regain the confidence of the Palestinian people. The space and license that were granted to President Arafat to manipulate the system are no longer available to any of his successors who will be subject to intense scrutiny and serious accountability. Thus they will feel his absence as a patron and protector—a source of their own legitimacy and power—as well as the cover for their failure or the excuse for their inaction.

Neither prime minister nor president of the Palestinian Authority can afford to perpetuate a centralized and personalized system of favors, self interest, and control. They, and the PLO leadership to a lesser degree, will be required to build efficient institutions, to act within the law, and to accept oversight and accountability. Regardless of the margin of victory in elections, all public officials will have to refer to their electorate for their mandate and legitimacy. Furthermore, the Speaker of the Legislative Council can no longer subvert the institution as part of a struggle for political advantage nor undertake executive tasks (including negotiations) that clearly indicate a conflict of interest. All will be required to deliver quickly and decisively, and the first test will be the reform of the security forces (merging and institutionalizing on the basis of the law) in order to deliver public order and security and the upgrading and reform of the judiciary to be able to deliver justice and equality before the law. In addition, the political map of Palestine will undergo changes as the different factions begin to reassess their power as well as their political programs. The Islamic opposition, Hamas and Jihad Islami, will no longer be able to avoid the imperatives of democracy, and will thus have to engage in the process of elections to gauge their power, to obtain their mandate, and to accept accountability. Their traditional demand of the “piece of the pie” in the form of a “unified national leadership” outside the PA and the PLO structures will be invalidated, as will their claim that they are carrying out the “wishes of the Palestinian people” in pursuing a course of armed struggle and violence as the only means of resistance.

The left-wing factions, within and outside the Authority, will also have to face up to their failure to gain a constituency or to develop a discourse that merges nation-building with peacemaking. The transformation of factional politics into party systems will be the first and essential requisite in the establishment of a pluralistic, multi-party inclusive democracy. The Palestinian public is fed up with rhetorical slogans, frozen clichés, and empty pronouncements that are incapable of providing a handle on reality or delivering services and ensuring social justice. The emergence of the “third way” option will have to be in the form of a bold, secular, and forward-looking democratic coalition to break the simplistic polarization of an inept, corrupt national power faced with an Islamic ideological opposition. Such an alternative will have to address the requirements of establishing a democratic system of governance with integrity and efficiency, while articulating a strategy and program for peace that can attract the three essential players: a Palestinian constituency, the Israeli public, and the international community. The rhetoric of “all-or-nothing,” the threat of violence, and “double-speak” in the dichotomy of secret deals and misleading public promises have no place in a new movement-cum-party that must respect the intelligence and moral fiber of its own people—and those of the rest of the world for that matter. Its engagement in internal and global realities must emanate from its own conviction of the justice and integrity of the Palestinian cause on the one hand, and the need to restore its position at the heart of international legality and peacemaking on the other, with self confidence, mutual respect, and authentic commitment.

As it stands now, the current figures in the Palestinian leadership are required to constitute a real transition, or to form a bridge between past patterns of authority and future systems of governance. The fact that they rapidly held on to power, and were even encouraged to do so, has been for the explicit purpose of maintaining stability and ensuring a smooth transition towards the empowerment of a genuinely “new” leadership. Ironically, their mission is to actually render themselves obsolete and to relinquish power at the earliest opportunity to be replaced by institutional meritocracy, pluralistic democracy, and systemic rule of law.

Beyond the domestic, however, the actions and policies of the Israeli occupation are decisive factors in determining the success or failure of this transition. The mentality of the occupier, with its racist and condescending attempts at placing the Palestinians on probation and demanding impossible preconditions for even entertaining the idea of reengaging in negotiations will generate greater distrust and subvert any Palestinian peace effort. Continuing the policy of brutality and escalation, including siege and fragmentation, settlement expansion, building the separation wall, assassinations and abductions, military incursions and assaults, home demolitions and destruction of crops, and all other forms of gratuitous cruelty and deliberate humiliation will destroy the chances of peace along with the Palestinian peace partner.

Now is the time for Israel to reconsider its whole failed and dangerous policies that have fueled the flames of fear, hatred, violence and extremism. Lifting the siege and allowing the Palestinians throughout the occupied territories (including East Jerusalem) to carry out their elections freely and without any threat or negative intervention is a positive first step. Releasing political prisoners, particularly elected representatives including Marwan Barghouthi and Husam Khader, and PLO leaders such as Abdel-Rahim Mallouh, will send positive signals of good will to the Palestinian people while contributing to stability and quiet as well as to the credibility of the peace option and players.

Furthermore, Israel will have to commit to engaging in serious and substantive negotiations on all aspects, including permanent status issues, without any further prolongation or preconditions. It will have to cooperate with the Quartet, or any other multinational or international body, in implementing the Road Map and achieving the end of the occupation and the two state solution as soon as possible.

The “political capital” that President George W. Bush has gained in his second term election must be “invested” in a viable and rapid peace process that can lay claim to legality, justice, and permanence. Having committed to the Road Map and to the two-state solution, the US cannot afford to keep altering its policies to accommodate Israeli demands and priorities, including the fourteen reservations on the Road Map or the illegal paybacks demanded in return for Sharon’s “unilateral disengagement” from Gaza.

Cooperation with its Quartet partners, particularly the European Union and the UN, will certainly contribute to bridging the transatlantic divide and restoring some of the US’s global and regional standing in the aftermath of its catastrophic war on Iraq. If the US decides to play the role of the even-handed peacemaker and to curb Israeli violations and excesses, it will have begun the real process of combating extremism and terrorism by addressing the grievances on which they thrive. Contrary to the neocon agenda, the path to democracy and development is through the just solution of the Palestinian question and a lasting Middle East peace rather than through war and the circumvention of long standing regional grievances. The hearts and minds of the Arab and Muslim publics can be won, not by glib public relations exercises, but by a serious reassessment of US policy toward the Palestinian question and the continuing cruelty and injustice of the Israeli occupation. A paradigm shift in the region requires a transformation of American policy and priorities with a political scope beyond the selective limitations of such projects as “The Broader Middle East Initiative.”

In concrete terms, the following steps may constitute positive intervention to generate a real momentum for peace:

1. Engage both sides to bring about an immediate “cessation of hostilities” or a ceasefire to end the violence.
2. Bring Israel to lift the siege and fragmentation of the Palestinian territories, with the occupation forces returning to the Sept. 2000 lines.
3. Provide the conditions and climate necessary for free and fair Palestinian presidential, legislative and local government elections in the West Bank (including Jerusalem) and Gaza, including cessation of collective punitive measures, settlement activities, and construction of the separation wall.
4. In cooperation with the relevant Arab countries and members of the international community, provide active support for a massive reform and development plan in Palestine by adopting the integrated approach of linking security and economic reform and development with a political framework and binding assurances and guarantees on the outcome.
5. Create a territorial, political, economic, and legal linkage between Gaza and the West Bank, while ensuring that Israel neither demand or receive “payback” in the West Bank for the evacuation of Gaza settlements.
6. Convene the international conference to signal the launching of a new phase; to articulate legal terms of reference; to commence immediate negotiations on permanent status issues; to define the objective of the two-state solution in clear terms; to commit to a binding time frame and ensure rapid progress; to signal the international community’s commitment to seeing the process through and ensuring no further transitions and no unilateral actions by either side.
7. Define the role and responsibilities of the “third party” to include: mediation; direct participation in negotiations as needed; arbitration; averting/solving crises and disputes along the way; providing creative compromises and alternatives when required; providing assurances and guarantees to maintain the integrity of the process; funding the process of development, reconstruction, and peace-building to provide continuity and sustainability.
8. Introduce peace forces on the ground: to provide “separation” as well as a “cooling down” mechanism and to facilitate communication and coordination as needed; to constitute a monitoring and verification mechanism; and to provide training and capacity building. These forces could be international, multinational, NATO, or a “coalition of the willing” with peaceful intent.
9. Designate high level, empowered envoys from all concerned parties (including the Quartet and the relevant Arab countries) to signal highest level involvement, to ensure a continued integrated approach, and to maintain momentum.
10. All sponsors/third-party-participants must be willing to employ both positive inducements and punitive measures, including sanctions, to ensure compliance.

Should a “window of opportunity” exist in this period of flux, then it has to be exploited rapidly by all concerned parties before it is hijacked once again by the lethal dynamic of the escalating oppression of the occupation, the violence of revenge and retribution, or the ascendancy of extremism and absolutism. The solution has already gained a global consensus; all it needs is a combination of political will, intellectual foresight, and moral courage.

In one fell blow, US President George W. Bush, having carried out a revolutionary reversal in American policy towards the Middle East, “succeeded” in subverting not only the road map, but any prospects for peace in the region. By lending legitimacy to the Israeli occupation’s lawlessness and violations of international law, the US has ultimately negated UN resolutions, including 194, 242, 338, 1397, international humanitarian law, and all other legal foundations on which a viable and just peace must be based.

By fully accommodating Sharon and his extremist government, the US is preempting and negatively prejudging permanent status issues—primarily boundaries, settlements, Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees and water rights.

Furthermore, President Bush has become complicit with Israeli Prime Minister Sharon in completely excluding the Palestinians as partners in negotiations that determine their future. Ironically, Bush thereby gave himself license not only to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians, but also to compromise and relinquish their inalienable rights.

His endorsement of Sharon’s unilateralism and control is in effect a significant acquiescence to the transformation of Gaza into a massive prison, entirely besieged by Israel, with no attributes of sovereignty or independence. Israel will maintain full control of airspace, territorial waters, and crossing points of Gaza. In addition, the Gaza Bantustan will be cut off from the rest of the world and, most devastatingly, from the rest of Palestinian territories in the West Bank and Jerusalem.

Granting unqualified support to Sharon, Bush implicitly allowed Israel to extort the “right” to carry out incursions into Gaza and to maintain military presence there, as it sees fit, while simultaneously accepting the claim that Gaza is no longer “occupied territory.” The implications are enormous in that Israel will avoid any obligations or accountability in accordance with the Fourth Geneva Convention. Conversely, the Palestinian Authority will be held responsible for issues (most prominently security) it has been rendered incapable of controlling.

The US has effectively subverted the road map and replaced it with Sharon’s designs to introduce a long term interim phase in which Israel can have a free hand to create irreversible facts and finally eradicate the possibility of establishing a viable Palestinian state on the June 4th, 1967, lines. In this context, Sharon has managed to transform the Quartet into a US monopoly, sidelining the remaining trio. He has also rid himself of the Palestinian “demographic nightmare” as well as the “security” concerns of the densely populated Gaza Strip. He demanded and received “payback” from the Americans in the form of territorial and demographic concessions in the West Bank, including Jerusalem, to serve Israel’s expansionist policy.

Israel manipulated the US in such a way as to gain retroactive legitimacy for its illegal settlements, while pressing ahead with its punitive wall of separation and land acquisition. In addition, Israel got tacit American approval for its assassination policy (which encouraged Sharon to threaten the life of the elected Palestinian President Yasser Arafat), as well as for its siege and fragmentation of the occupied territories. Furthermore, by making Sharon the promise of not allowing any other peace initiatives, including the Arab initiative adopted during the Arab League summit in Beirut, Bush passed up the historic opportunity of achieving a comprehensive peace in the region.

In an unprecedented policy shift, the US has become a partner in Israel’s illegal occupation, disqualifying itself as an evenhanded peace broker. It has further inflamed Palestinian, Arab, Islamic and even global public opinion by adopting such irresponsible policies that betray total ignorance of regional realities, thereby undermining its global credibility and standing. Most seriously, the US has fed the flames of extremism, radicalization, fundamentalism and violence, hence contributing to the causes of terrorism rather than eliminating them.

Given all of the above, is there any room for rectification or damage control?

It is incumbent upon the international community to address and redress the negative ramifications of such shortsightedness. The fact that the Quartet will be meeting in New York on May 4th, requires a swift formulation of remedial measures starting with the convening of an international conference to rearticulate a global commitment to a negotiated settlement that would bring about complete Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of a viable and independent Palestinian state on the June 4th, 1967, lines. This conference must also reaffirm the legal terms of reference for any peace process and ensure that no permanent status issue will be prejudged or preempted by any unilateral actions or declarations by the parties and the sponsors alike.

The Quartet can issue its own statement of assurances and guarantees to the Palestinians in order to undo part of the damage done by Bush’s assurances to Sharon. It is also the responsibility of the Quartet to incorporate any Israeli withdrawal within the road map as part of an ongoing peace process with a self sustaining momentum and clear steps of implementation. In addition, the Quartet must enter into negotiations with the Palestinians in order to work out a concrete plan for the empowerment of the PA, in order to be able to subsequently undertake its responsibilities and the takeover of Gaza. Security issues can not be addressed apart from economic and political contexts and measures. Part of this empowerment includes control over the Palestinian airport, seaport and land crossing points in cooperation with the international community and with Egypt concerning the Philadelphia border in particular.

It would be inadvisable to allow for the continued exclusion of the legitimate Palestinian Authority or to maintain the possibility of internal conflict or collapse.

However, the continued erosion of the PA’s power and standing and its inability to deliver to its own people, let alone to the international community, would require some form of third party intervention in the form of transitional arrangements. Such issues as water, sanitation, power, trade, and labor, among others require full coordination and partnership with a Palestinian counterpart. If the PA continues to be immobilized, then it should accept an international or multinational coalition to undertake such tasks, as well as overall responsibility for Gaza as a temporary measure. Israel would, therefore, cede Gaza to an ad hoc international body (a coalition of the willing) that would in turn and at the appropriate time hand over full responsibility to the Palestinian side in the context of a viable and sustained peace process.

In light of rapidly deteriorating conditions on the ground, there is an urgent need to transform potential disaster into an opportunity for hope and peace. This is a real test and challenge for the Quartet in their upcoming meeting.

Dear Friends, Sisters and Brothers—

The Sydney Peace Foundation, its members and partners, as well as its distinguished director, Prof. Stuart Rees, have taken the difficult decision to make a difference, to stand up for justice and the pursuit of peace, and to intervene as a positive force in the resolution of global conflicts. I am truly honored to be included in this endeavor among such distinguished recipients of the Sydney Peace Prize. May I also view this prize as a recognition of all those who have maintained an unwavering commitment to a just resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, who have defied the prevailing dynamic of violence and the mutual infliction of pain and delegitimization, and who continue to provide hope in the midst of despair on both sides of the “divide.” Palestinians and Israelis, as well as people of good conscience throughout the world, will share the empowerment of this recognition as a significant force for reconciliation and inclusion.

You too have chosen courageously to take sides in the struggle against injustice as opposed to the refuge of so-called neutrality or the self-interest of power. You have refused to be deflected, intimidated, or silenced, exercising a tenacity and determination that are the rare attributes of moral leadership and genuine service. In this context, the Premier of New South Wales, Bob Carr, stands out as the most appropriate embodiment of these qualities. For that too, I am truly grateful.

It is precisely during such times of adversity and pain, of violence and victimization, of unilateralism and militarism, of ideological fundamentalism and absolutist exclusivity, that the world is most in need of voices and forces of sanity, reason and moral responsibility—the genuine building blocks of peace. As we witness attempts at imposing a simplistic view of a Manichean universe, of polarization and reductive stereotypes of good and evil, we are most in need of those who will engage in a redemptive validation of pluralism, tolerance, diversity, authenticity of identity, and the comprehensive engagement in collective responsibility. As such, it is up to us jointly to give both a voice and an audience to the silenced, and to grant space and time to the excluded and denied.

Such is the nature of intervention that the world requires, not only to resolve conflicts but also to prevent them from erupting or generating their own destructive forces that could spiral out of control. No conflict should take us by surprise, for all the symptoms are recognizable and the components definable. Long-standing grievances and inequities have become all too familiar and have been left to fester on their own or to be manipulated by the strong as a means of victimizing the weak. The nature of preemptive action must be, by necessity and choice, constructive, peaceful, and therapeutic.

Since an aspect of globalization is the redefinition of enemies and allies, friends and foes, crossing national, territorial, and cultural boundaries, the process of rectification must also utilize the means made available by the knowledge and IT revolution as tools of contemporary global realities. Thus hunger, poverty, illiteracy, the spread of disease, the degradation of the environment, the disenfranchisement of the weak, the suspension of human rights, among others, are all universal enemies that require the collective effort of universal allies. Human-based development programs and inclusive systems of governance remain the most appropriate means of empowerment.

Most significantly, the indispensable universal instruments remain those that ascertain a global rule of law, encompassing both state and non-state actors, capable of assessing culpability, providing accountability, and ensuring redress with justice. Along with their multilateral institutions, they remain safeguards against unilateral power on the rampage or destructive military preemption on the basis of subjective criteria.

With that in mind, peace in the Middle East, or the just solution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, can be addressed in its proper context as the longest standing case of military occupation and as the most persistent unresolved case of denial, dispossession and exile in contemporary history. As such, it is also an anachronism in that it has all the components of a colonial condition in a post neo-colonial world, plus the requirements of national self-determination as a basis of nascent statehood in a world moving towards regional and global redefinitions.

Regionally, the conflict has provided a convenient excuse for the suspension of human rights, the evasion of democratic systems of governance, the waste of natural and human resources, and the perpetuation of centralized regimes that held back the challenges of development—all under the guise of “national security” and the external military threat. For decades, war, or the threat of military hostilities, has served to maintain the status quo and has framed the region within misplaced notions of self defense that contributed to the rising power of extremism and fundamentalism rather than human empowerment and global engagement.

Peace, or the prospect thereof, is possibly the most effective force for dislodging such notions and trends, becoming, de facto, the most destabilizing factor in a region suffering from an imposed state of suspended animation. The legacy of colonialism clearly has served the interests of those in power, predominantly client regimes, who sought to maintain control, thereby leading to the collusion of internal and external forces in the exclusion of the people as a whole. A just and comprehensive solution to the Palestinian-Israeli (and hence Arab-Israeli) conflict would unleash all those forces so far held in abeyance, but forming the indispensable energy for sustainable progress, development, democratization, and regional integration. While threatening short-term stability based on restrictive and constrictive norms and patterns, it constitutes the sole mechanism for any stability that can lay claim to permanence on the basis of contemporary and future-oriented political, social, cultural, and economic systems of cooperation and interdependence.

Globally, the Palestinian question remains central to any human vision of globalization as a test of the collective will to intervene and to maintain a global rule of law based on operative principles of justice and historical redemption. Granted, the current dynamic is antithetical to the aspirations of peacemakers who had based their endeavors on the universality of human rights, parity before the law, positive intervention, and the non-violent resolution of conflicts through redress and the elimination of grievances. A serious paradigm shift is necessary for the restoration of these human values that have been subverted in the aftermath of September 11 and the triumph of the neoconservatives and fundamentalist ideologues in key power centers.

The logic of peace that had been formulated painstakingly (and painfully) as the substance of Palestinian-Israeli encounters and dialogues, even long before negotiations, is currently being drowned by the din of war drums and the frenzied mutual infliction of pain over the last three years. Such tragic and unprecedented pervasive violence is not only eradicating previous achievements and agreements, but is also destroying the prospects of any future reconciliation. Its most alarming impact is on the perceptions and attitudes of both peoples, particularly in the regression towards the fallacies of the past and the stance of mutual negation emanating from the revival of deep-seated existential fears of survival.

Such fallacies and false assumptions must be boldly confronted and systematically deconstructed if there is any hope of extricating both sides from this lethal and self-perpetuating trap of mutual destruction.

The notion that a whole nation can be brought to its knees by the use of unbridled violence, or that the will of a people can be defeated by military means must be discarded once and for all. Armies may be able to defeat other armies, but the limits of power are most apparent when used against civilians and non-combatants. Along with that, the fallacy that there is or can be a military solution to the conflict must be completely and irrevocably discarded.

Conversely, the emergence of the bizarre concept of a “balance of terror” has reinforced the irrational and immoral killing of civilians and the victimization of the innocent. The drive for revenge, like the escalation of military brutality, has generated the most tragic and futile momentum for escalation and self-destruction. On both sides, the “no holds barred” mindset has taken over as a mindless, visceral, repetitive response with horrific ramifications. The erroneous assumption that greater pain and punishment, or the escalation of failed measures, would somehow lead to “success” or the surrender of one side to the other is at the heart of the prevailing dynamic of death and devastation.

Related to that is the notion that a people under occupation will eventually come to be reconciled to the fact of their captivity and to accept their fate without struggling for freedom and dignity. Self determination to the Palestinian people is not an abstraction, but the actual realization and enactment of their identity on their own land, and a motivating force for independence and statehood. It is the final negation of the myth of a “land without a people for a people without a land” that has long framed the rationalization for the most extreme forms of Zionism that sought to deny the very existence and humanity of the Palestinians.

For the conflict to be resolved, its causes must be identified and solved, while grievances and fears on both sides must be addressed and laid to rest. Neither side can lay claim to a monopoly of pain and suffering, in the same way as it cannot claim exclusivity of narrative and legitimacy. Clearly, peace cannot be made incumbent upon converting all Palestinians to Zionism or transforming all Israelis to espouse Palestinian nationalism.

The denial or distortion of the narrative of the other has served as a convenient vehicle for the dehumanization of the adversary and hence as a justification for all forms of violations and atrocities while evading accountability. Historical records must be reconciled, whether in the recognition of the horror of the holocaust and all its horrendous implications, or in the historical victimization of the Palestinian people and their dual tragedy of dispossession and exile, on the one hand, and oppression and occupation on the other.

It should also become apparent that, ironically, in this context the Palestinians and Israelis have reached the stage of dependent legitimacies rather than a competition over a singular and mutually exclusive legitimacy. Since the essential requirement for peace lies in sharing the land of historical Palestine, it follows that there has to be a shared legitimacy based on parity and mutuality. Neither side can (or should be allowed to) destroy the other physically, morally, or legally. A full admission of equal value to human lives and rights must be internalized, with no claims to superiority on those most essential human values and attributes.

In the same way, there can be no exclusivity of claims—whether to the land or to security or to the discourse and public presentation of the issues. Shared boundaries exist both as territorial and as moral/human concepts of proximity and interaction. Security, therefore, is a factor of mutuality and interdependence, emanating from the core considerations of the totality of human imperatives. Historical, territorial, cultural, economic, social, personal, existential, legal, and political dimensions of security must shape the issues and drive the process beyond the narrow confines of military security. A human and humanistic strategic approach to peace is by definition one of integrated empowerment rather than the stratagems of power politics or coercion or military control.

At the opposite pole, the fallacy of fundamentalism, or even divine intervention and dispensation, has been exploited to justify absolutism and exclusivity, thereby ending all hope of a solution based on accommodation, while claiming unrestricted license to kill and destroy. Extremist ideologies tend to thrive in times of despair and insecurity, and like the recourse to violence and militarism, they signal an absence of effective workable solutions and handles on reality.

Radicalization is also a factor of distortion in the sweeping ideologies and simplistic generalizations of theories such as the “clash of civilizations” or “war among religions” or the imposition of democracy by force of arms. Increasing polarization widens the gap and warps any vision of reconciliation not only by depicting the conflict as part of a grand sweep of teleological proportions, but primarily by rendering it impossible to resolve through available peaceful means of practical and legal disentanglement. Inevitability of conflict as defined by an abstract universal design is directly antithetical to responsibility and intervention.

By now it has become apparent that the assumption that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a purely bilateral issue and can be resolved by the two sides without third party intervention is entirely false. It has been variously used to maintain the asymmetry of power, to justify the lack of political will or the impotence of external actors, and to sustain other false assumptions such as the “peace through exhaustion” fallacy or “intervention following sufficient bloodshed.”

The need for third party intervention is not only a factor of balance, but an indispensable force for breaking the lethal cycle of violence and revenge, while providing a context for legality, arbitration, and guarantees. A genuine form of multilateralism and collective responsibility is the sine qua non of the resolution of this conflict. Artificial, unilateral, and power separation such as that represented by the expansionist apartheid wall is a recipe for further conflict and greater violence—not least for encapsulating many forms of coercive injustice including land and water theft, fragmentation of Palestinian reality and the creation of isolated ghettoes, and imposing political boundaries that destroy the chances of a viable Palestinian state, hence of a just peace.

Palestinian nation-building and statehood are imperative for peace and stability throughout the region. Democracy and separation of powers, the rule of law and respect for human rights, institution-building and good governance, transparent accountability and reform—all are the ingredients of viable Palestinian statehood. The occupation, however intrusive, must not be used as an excuse to avoid responsibility. Similarly, negotiations and compliance with agreements must not be suspended pending the establishment of a Palestinian Utopia. Devolution of occupation and evolution of statehood must proceed simultaneously with urgency and commitment as interdependent processes.

An instrument like the Road Map of the erstwhile Quartet could have served as a lifeline for peace had it been implemented with speed and integrity, with clear timelines, monitoring and verification mechanisms, and the courage to exercise impartial accountability. The incorporation of the Israeli amendments in the implementation has tarnished the integrity of the text and of the external actors as well. Frontloading the process with Palestinian obligations, adopting the sequential and conditional approach, and creating further interim phases without guarantees on the ground have rendered the Road Map inoperative and subject to extremists on both sides. Absent political will, even-handedness, and seriousness of intent, third party intervention could backfire and aggravate the conflict further through dashed hopes and let-downs.

However, third party interventions can also be destructive if motivated by special agendas, if they exercise bias, and if they are incapable of effecting reality on the ground. Without substance, legitimacy, and applicability such interventions create a semblance of engagement without coming to grips with the reality of the conflict itself. When the issue is relocated domestically to become part of internal political realities, particularly in election votes and funds or the influence of special interest groups, then the question becomes one of exploitation and self interest rather than serving the cause of peace.

The most detrimental external interference is that of the zealots and enthusiasts who embrace the most extreme long-distance stances with the “passionate intensity” of the “worst.” Blind loyalty for, and identification with, one side lead to the adoption of the most strident belligerency towards the other, hence intensifying the conflict and subverting dialogue and rational communication. Islamic fundamentalists and regressive brands of Arab nationalists have ironically joined forces with Christian evangelicals, Jewish fundamentalists, and ideological neoconservatives to fight their own proxy wars at the expense of moderate Palestinians and Israelis alike. Such radical apologists have inflicted serious damage and pain from their safe distance in Riyadh, Damascus, Washington, Knoxville, or Sydney demonstrating the type of intervention that no peace can survive.

The superimposition of blind loyalty or guilt has revived the worst of racist labeling and dehumanization with the additional superimposition of false analogies. It may be convenient to label all Palestinians as “terrorists” and dismiss them from the conscience of the world in the context of the “war on terrorism.” It may be equally convenient to describe the Israeli occupation’s measures of aerial bombardment and shelling of Palestinian civilian areas, of assassinations and abduction, of home demolition and destruction of crops, of siege and fragmentation, of checkpoints and humiliation, of illegal settlements and apartheid walls and annexation fences as legitimate forms of “self-defense.” It may be comfortable to dismiss decades of military occupation and dispossession as figments of the victim’s imagination, hence irrelevant to the current conflict. However, such scoring of points only makes the solution all that more distant.

So far, the solution remains simple and attainable, having been repeatedly defined and having become part of a global consensus. The two-state solution is still possible, though becoming increasingly more difficult with the expansion of settlements, by-pass roads, and the apartheid wall throughout Palestinian territory. The bi-national state as a de facto solution will become the only option should Israel continue its expansion and its refusal to withdraw to the June 4, 1967 lines and remove the settlements of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Territoriality will give way to demography, and the issue then will become one of democracy, with Zionism forced to reexamine its most basic premises.

Jerusalem, both East and West, can become an open city and the shared capital of two states, thus encapsulating the essence of peace and regaining its stature as a city much greater than itself and not subject to exclusive possession or greed of acquisition. The Palestinian refugees must be granted historical, legal, moral, and human recognition and redress in accordance with international law and the requirements of justice. There is no need to reinvent the wheel, but there is a need for the will and courage to act against all adverse forces.

Dear friends, sisters and brothers—as we hurtle towards the abyss, as we daily lose unique, irreplaceable lives, and as attitudes and hearts are hardening, may I take a moment to recognize this luminous instant in history that you are affording us. You have chosen to intervene on the side of those who have decided to take risks for peace rather than those who thrive on hate and conflict. It certainly takes a unique form of courage, tenacity, and distinctive human priorities to challenge prevailing fallacies and injustices. On behalf of the Palestinian people as a whole, and on behalf of all Palestinians and Israelis who have maintained their partnership for peace, and on behalf of all those who are in solidarity with our joint effort, I thank you. You have taken up a global challenge, and you certainly embody its human dimension. We are indeed heartened and empowered.

Acceptance speech delivered by Dr. Hanan Ashrawi at the Sydney Peace Prize ceremony, November 5th, 2003.

What consolation is there for the passing of a great man? He does not leave behind a great void—rather a heaviness of spirit, a weight almost unbearable that mercilessly seems to crush the heart and render each breath an ordeal.

But Edward Said was not just a great scholar, a brilliant mind, a creative artist, an ardent nationalist, an advocate of justice, a free spirit, an unrelenting force for integrity, an uncompromising fighter on behalf of human dignity, and all the other sets of superlative depictions that he so aptly deserves.

Edward was amazingly human, vulnerable in his larger-than-life status to all the personal pain and doubts that beset ordinary mortals, and never too self-preoccupied to let you gain entry to his life unnoticed.

He had a spring in his step and an almost-electrical spark in his gestures as he lectured us on literary criticism on an early visit to AUB, with Edward not much older than his student audience, Beirut, late 1960’s.

He had a tremor in his voice and excitement in his tone as he articulated the Palestinian Declaration of Independence, imbuing it with Palestinian authenticity and universal applicability, Algiers 1988.

He had sorrow in his heart at the passing of his friends—Iqbal Ahmad, Ibrahim Abu Lughod—and he grieved openly at their loss.

He had tears in his eyes when he told us that he had just been diagnosed with Leukemia, London 1991/92.

He had a ring to his laughter and a sparkle to his smile when he celebrated friendships that he never failed, nor they him—Abdel Muhsen Qattan, Shafeeq el-Hout, Hasib Sabbagh, Said Khoury, Rashid Khalidi, Daniel Barenboim, and many, many more.

He had a sharpness to his anger and moral indignation at the “indignity” of Oslo and the immorality of corruption in leadership.

He had a thunderous impatience with the obtuseness and deliberate ignorance of most Western media who insisted on reducing reality to an inane sound byte or a tepid dose of processed language.

He had a gentle identification with the oppressed and an intimidating rage against the oppressor, a warm embrace for the victim and a cold rejection of the culprit, a love for the post-apartheid South Africa and all that its struggle stood for, and a total loathing for discrimination, racism and the degradation of human life and rights.

He had the sharpest of ironic wits with which to deflate the most pompous of fools who were foolhardy enough to think that they could deceive or sustain their vacuous sense of self-importance.

He had the warmest sense of pride and love when talking about Wadi’ and Najla, the children who always filled his life, and Mariam, the gentle wife whose love was never in question.

He had a raging thirst for the recognition and validation of a human narrative to vindicate the almost unbearable suffering of the Palestinian people and to render them part of an inclusive human experience.

He had the integrity and compassion to extend recognition to the horrific suffering of the Jewish people and the unspeakable pain of the holocaust, and simultaneously to demand of Israel recognition of its own culpability for the plight of the Palestinian people.

He had the courage to seek solutions and alternatives, constantly on the lookout for a younger leadership, a mentor for those with promise.

He had the good humor not to take himself too seriously, accepting the burden of his fame and public adulation with humility, and granting his name to numerous Boards of institutions including MIFTAH and PICCR.

He had the restlessness of spirit that was singular to those whose “here and now” were too vast and swift to be accommodated by mundane space and time.

He had the energy of a man aware of his mortality, squeezing life out of every second, refusing to allow the dreaded disease to frame his space and time or to form his “context.”

Edward had a global/human context, a Palestinian context, a personal context. To me, he was mentor, brother, close friend. He was notes on my dissertation, phone calls on the Palestinian condition, hurried meetings in conferences or other public events around the world, and those rare relaxed visits in New York or Ramallah.

He was the Edward taking time off to have a home-cooked meal, sitting with the family around the table on the veranda overlooking the western hills of Ramallah, nibbling at food and conversation in a relaxed almost sleepy manner, shedding the intensity of his greatness for the luxury of being “at home” with friends.

Edward may have been “out of place” as his personal narrative encapsulated this unique form of Palestinian displacement, but he has always been “in place” for those of us who dared to take his genius and friendship for granted.

In addition to the unbearable burden of his death, we have to bear the knowledge that we had never been prepared to accept it.

For a man who has been described as “the conscience of Palestine,” his ultimate absence requires the greater affirmation of all that he had represented, both in the consciousness of a nation and in the hearts of those who loved him.

Sweden, a “small, remote” Scandinavian country, has had more of an impact on Palestinian history (and human reality) than closer or greater powers throughout the world.

The impact has been consistently constructive, positive, and human—with a deep-seated tradition of fairness, justice, and peaceful intervention.

Unfortunately, three such Swedish champions had met with violent and untimely deaths, each a tragedy unto itself, but a national and global loss in the larger scheme of things.

The assassination of Count Folke Bernadotte, UN Mediator on Palestine, in 1948 at the hands of the Israeli terrorist organization—the Stern Gang—began a lethal Swedish connection with Palestine.

An ardent champion of the underdog, particularly of the Jewish victims of the holocaust, and as a global humanitarian, Count Bernadotte was recruited on behalf of the UN to mediate among all parties to oversee the peaceful implementation of the Partition Resolution in Palestine. He was brutally murdered, shot at point blank, by three Jewish Stern Gang members in Jerusalem.

Palestine had lost its first Swedish champion.

In 1986, another human rights champion and a tireless campaigner on behalf of peace, justice, tolerance, and human dignity was senselessly murdered. The death of the then Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme deprived the world, Sweden, and Palestine of a courageous voice and an unrelenting force towards shaping a politics of moral and human integrity.

Olof Palme steadfastly opposed the racist apartheid regime in South Africa and consistently supported the ANC and other victims of that regime.

In Palestine, he sought recognition for the PLO and a validation for the peaceful resolution of the conflict through ending the 1967 Israeli occupation of Palestinian and other Arab lands. Palme firmly anchored his politics in international legality and UN resolutions, but also in a deeply-felt commitment to fairness and human decency.

Yesterday, a third tragedy befell Sweden, Europe, and the world in the brutal and also senseless murder of Foreign Minister Anna Lindh.

She too had courageously reached out to the downtrodden and excluded. She gave voice to the silenced and spoke out on their behalf with conviction and integrity. She was never intimidated or silenced, and the brute exercise of power by the strong only added to the potency of her gentle yet unwavering message.

When the Olof Palme Foundation graciously offered me the peace award named after him, I felt that the Palestinian cause—as well as the cause of peace, justice, and humanity—was being granted renewed hope and vitality.

Both Sten Anderssen and Pierre Schorri—two significant and globally recognized Swedish actors on behalf of peace and responsible politics—completed the tribute to the Palme legacy and also recognized in the promise of Anna Lindh renewed hope and promise.

She touched us all with her humility, intelligence, integrity, and valor. She dwarfed all who were too full of themselves to see the power of a woman, a sister, who quietly and gently neutralized their sense of misplaced power and domination. She dominated by refusing to control or to be manipulated. She radiated honesty and good humor, but never accepted to compromise with injustice or oppression. She was formidable in her simplicity.

Anna is one person who should not have been described in the past tense. She should have remained in the present also as a promise for the future. And her promise was—is—for a better future for humanity as a whole.

Anna’s passing is a personal loss, and I grieve for her along with her family and friends. Anna’s loss is a human tragedy, a promise dimmed before its time, an absence that will be felt in pain and with a real sense of deprivation.

Sweden has generously given the world, and has brutally taken back, yet another gift of love.

JERUSALEM As is becoming increasingly clear, the Americans did themselves a great disfavor by ostracizing Yasser Arafat, because in doing so they bolstered his support among the Palestinians. Since the United States and Israel attacked him, people have been rallying around him.

By trying to isolate Arafat, the Americans also mistakenly distanced themselves from a source of legitimate power and decision-making in Palestine. So now they have to get to Arafat indirectly, through intermediaries, whereas before they could influence him directly.

The United States and Israel need to talk to Arafat in order to address any serious issue. There is no reason for their boycott of him. It is childish and manipulative. If the United States is serious about peace, it has to deal with Palestinian realities, not realities manufactured in someone's mind.

Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian prime minister, cannot do anything on his own without the cooperation of Arafat, just as he needs the help of Fatah and the Palestinian Legislative Council. Everybody has been trying to help Abbas, but he also has to help himself and understand he gains his legitimacy from the people and not just from the Americans or the Israelis.

There is such a thing as killing with kindness, and this is what the United States is doing to Abbas. Washington needs to understand the sensitivities and the balances and the intricate relationships within Palestinian domestic politics.

The State Department seems to understand this dynamic of domestic politics, and I have tried to explain it to the national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, who is beginning to understand that meddling in Palestinian politics could backfire. The Americans have to understand that when they attack Arafat, he gets more support; when they embrace Abbas, he gets less.

The problem is that within the White House and Pentagon, people don't have any connections with Palestinians. They still don't know the full Palestinian narrative and the Arab point of view that makes our politics tick. They tend to make simplistic decisions on the basis of the Israeli version, to which they are exposed daily.

I have been asked lately if all of this might deteriorate into civil war. There is an awareness among Palestinians that civil war would be fatal for everybody, but at the same time being aware of it does not mean being able to avert it. The only way to do that is to remove the pressures that are leading the Palestinians in that direction. The No. 1 source of pressure is the Israeli assassinations, followed by the siege, the destruction, the abductions and the prisoners.

There is also, of course, pressure on Arafat and Abbas to destroy the infrastructure of terrorism - even though Israel, which has been an occupying power all these years, has not been able to stop the violence. To call on the Palestinian Authority to stop what Israel couldn't stop is to set the authority up for a fall.

The writer is secretary general of the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy, which she founded in 1998, and represents the Jerusalem district on the Palestinian Legislative Council. This comment was adapted from an interview with Stanley Sheinbaum and distributed by Global Viewpoint for Tribune Media Services International.